Caramel was initially a general natural language understanding system, intended to be applied to various kinds of application (e.g., dialogue, story understanding, abstracting). For a long time, I have considered consciousness as a crucial point and, in the late eighties, I developed a first model based on reflectivity. Given the inadequacy of the control mechanisms in classical natural language understanding systems, and the usefulness of multi-expert systems in order to remain modular without introducing artificial ambiguities, I proposed some extensions to classical reflectivity in order to make natural language understanding systems reflective and to have a first very elementary kind of "artificial consciousness".
Relations between natural language and consciousness

Generalities
In my previous publications concerning the relations between Natural Language Understanding and architecture (Sabah 1990b , Sabah 1990c , Sabah 1993 , Sauvage, et al. 1989 , CARAMEL stands for "Compréhension Automatique de Récits, Apprentissage et Modélisation des Échanges Langagiers", which translates into English as "Automatic Story Understanding, Learning and Dialogue Management". This indicates that the model only intended to tackle Natural Language Understanding. Even if the model had a very ambitious goal (as the system applied to many different kinds of applications -e.g., dialogue, story understanding, abstracting), it was not included into a general model of reasoning and intelligence.
However, I have been considering consciousness as a crucial aspect for natural language understanding for a long time, and the studies cited above have shown how reflectivity and distributed artificial intelligence allow for computer programs to represent their behaviour and reason about these representations in a dynamic way.
Non-controlled processes appeared also to be necessary in this kind of program for computer efficiency reasons as well as as for cognitive ones. Therefore, I proposed a blackboard extension (the Sketchboard -or carnet d'esquisses in French) that implies a different kind of relation between processes and allows for reactive feedback loops at different levels between processes that do not know each other 1 .
In order for these two categories of processes (controlled and uncontrolled) to collaborate, consciousness clearly has a central role to play. I propose here a new general cognitive model that is based on the assumption that language is the necessary ability that allows for intelligence.
To take this point into account, the name CARAMEL now means (in French): Conscience, Mind and Language) . This model takes many inspirations from various sources whose essential points are summarised below.
Automatismes, Réflexivité et Apprentissage pour un Modèle de l'Esprit et du Langage (in English:
Consciousness, Automatic processes, Reflectivity and Learning for a Model of
Baars (Baars 1988) , with a psychologist point of view, offers an "economical" conception of consciousness. A general workspace, specialised unconscious processes and contexts (conceived as hierarchies of goals) are the only three main components of his theory. From him we retain the following ideas:
• a blackboard as a workspace where conscious data are written;
• the hierarchy of interpretative contexts and the handling of interruptions;
• the competition between several unconscious processes; and • the model of voluntarily control and attention.
Harth (Harth 1993 ) is opposed to Cartesian dualism as well as to the more recent radical pluralism ("a million witless agents instead of one clever homunculus"). For him, mental images are not replicaes of world objects, they are combined with previous knowledge. Top-down ways allow higher knowledge to modify messages that come from senses and to inject into them additional information. This process is active as soon as sensorial input begins (and not at the end, as one would assume if considering it as an advanced function of the brain). Therefore, there is no homunculus scrutinizing the state of the brain. The brain itself acts as an observer of these first levels and influences them in order to maximise the recognition: the brain analyses, recreates and analyses again its own productions, in a truly "creative loop". From this theory, we took :
• the idea of feedback between unconscious processes;
• the a priori evaluations of unconscious processes; and • consciousness acting at the first levels of treatment rather than at the end.
Eccles (Eccles 1992) is practically alone (with Popper) to base his theory on dualism! He distinguishes three worlds among which there exist recursive relations (1-material, 2-consciousnessstates, 3-objective knowledge). With his micro-sites hypothesis, based on quantum physics, he tries to explain how mental events can act upon neural events (mind being compared with a quantum probabilistic field allowing for activating pre-synaptic net vesicles). Though his presentation lacks precise information on the real "implementation", he develops the interesting idea (close to Harth's) that conscious mind is not only engaged in a passive reading of the brain activity, but has a) a proper searching activity (e.g., attention, pulsion, necessity) and b) the role of unifying the whole set of information. The main parts of his theory that are useful for my new model are:
• the division of data and knowledge among three separated but communicating worlds; and • the asymmetry of the brain and the articulations between language and consciousness.
Edelman's vision of consciousness (Edelman 1989 , Edelman 1992 ) is based on a theory of the brain functions, in its turn based on a thesis of evolution and development.
The core of his approach is the TNGS (Theory of Neuronal Group Selection) based on three principles : ontogenetical selection; secondary synaptic reinforcements or decay; interactions among cerebral maps by a bi-directional re-entry.
He exhibits the neurobiological functions that have allowed the emergence and the evolution of more and more elaborated characteristics of the human mind. He also demonstrates how these characteristics are an explanation of consciousness. They are: 1) neural specialisations allowing the distinction of internal signals from world signals, 2) perceptual categorisation, 3) memory as a process of continuous re-categorisation with the possibility of representing the activation order, 4) learning (links between the categories and the essential values of the individual), 5) concept acquisition (categorisation of the brain activity through global maps) 6) primary consciousness (allowing to connect internal states that result from previous perceptual categorisations, to present perceptions -what he calls : the remembered present ), 7) an ordering capability which results in a presyntax (the basis for symbols) 8) language and 9) higher order consciousness. Here, I have been mainly inspired by:
• the definition of unconscious processes as basically producing correlations, • the definition of semantics as correlations between concepts, sensory input and symbols, • the memory model as a categorisation of processes rather that as a zone for storing representations, and
• the role of language for symbol manipulations.
I will first give some theoretical and practical justifications for taking into consideration unconscious as well as conscious processes, and then propose a model of memory that is in agreement with this aspect. Secondly, I will recall the basic elements on which is based our global model of understanding (the Sketchboard for unconscious processes and a model of reflective agents for conscious processes -the old Caramel). Finally, I will propose a computer model that shows how these two levels can be linked through a process having strong analogy with consciousness.
Necessity for two kinds of processes 2
Understanding is not only based on logical criteria, it is also the emerging result of non rational cognitive processes that cannot be described in an algorithmic way. While we think, either we are able to say something about the way some mental operations are performed (these will be called "conscious processes"), either we are only able to realise what their results are ("unconscious"). As clearly enhanced in (Baars 1988), these two kinds of processes differ on the following points (see Even if non controlled, unconscious cognitive processes are supposed to be exhaustive and not to depend on the cognitive load (Newell 1990) . From my point of view, this may not be true at every level. As soon as they draw near to consciousness, unconscious processes have to limit themselves, as they have to compete in order to take control over a very limited working memory. We propose here a smart and simple explanation for this transition between subliminal perception and conscious perception.
In order to control the analysis rules, and to avoid combinatorial explosion, classical rational approaches use metaknowledge (Pitrat 1990) . However, if it seems difficult to foresee some conflicts only by using logical reasoning, it seems even more difficult to solve them by these means alone.
For example, during syntactic parsing, the best interpretations usually follow the minimal attachment principle (don't postulate, in the syntactic tree, a potentially useless node) and the differed closing principle (if it is grammatically possible, attach any new element to the current phrase) principle. A big problem with such very general principles is that we are unable to easily detect the exceptions (e.g., the study of corpora allows to set up general rules but does not enable specific cases). It is the reason for which these regularities cannot be used as formal parsing rules. However, they may be explained as an emerging consequence of the competition between interpretative processes: usually, the interpretations that follow minimal attachment and differed closing are the most simple to build, and, as a consequence the first ones to be consciously perceived.
Most certainly, rational thought is also an important part of understanding, but it should intervene only after such a spontaneous perception of meaning (this distinction allows us to distinguish between "true" ambiguities, due to the communicative situation -and that should be solved by a dynamic, rational planning -and artificial ambiguities that usually remain implicit without a deep linguistic analysis).
Our hypothesis is that data in working memory is transferred to short term memory (i.e., become conscious -cf. § 4.1 and 4.5) when a given threshold of persistence is overshot, depending upon their accessibility and their lasting time. This transfer is viewed here as the "feeling of understanding". This process generally concerns only one interpretation at a time. Such an interpretation is perceived globally as an already constituted entity (pop-out) and may further become the basic element of a logical simulation of rational thought.
As psychological experiments about semantic priming have shown (e.g., (Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971) ), knowledge structures are characterised by variable and dynamic accessibilities. This property has to be taken into account in an ergonomic model of understanding. Indeed, the cost associated to each elementary interpretative operation is closely linked to the time necessary to attain pieces of knowledge in the memory. Therefore, interpretations which are coherent with the most accessible knowledge are the most likely to become the best ones: since they are more rapidly constructed, the cognitive system that constructs them can devote more attention to them. Thus, the system naturally prefers the interpretations that are the closest to the activated knowledge, i.e., the most relevant considering the current state of the context.
Due to the fact that the attention of a process may be distributed among several interpretations, the analysis is performed in a parallel way. However, this capability is not very flexible, since the computed entities are stored in a limited-capacity memory. The cognitive system should use this memory in the most efficient way, which is performed by an automatic non-conscious optimisation: the attention is focalised on the most relevant interpretations.
This allows us to take advantage of the dynamic properties of the memory: frequently accessed knowledge becomes more and more accessible, which makes the relevant interpretations more and more likely, which in turn makes the corresponding knowledge more and more accessible, and so on (positive recursive feedback). The space occupied by less accessed knowledge is quickly used for a more useful usage, and the associated interpretations slow down or disappear (let us remark that an explicit evaluation of relevance is no longer necessary, since it is implicitly performed with regard to the state of knowledge evolution: dynamic accessibility of knowledge and parallel analysis are sufficient to explain how the most relevant interpretations emerge). The interpretations are not compared on a structural basis, but through their competition to occupy memory.
Individually, each possible interpretation is computed in a bottom-up (data-driven), sequential way. Nevertheless, context implies that the whole system converges towards a resulting interpretation, very often a unique one. Indeed, the interpretations are developed at different speeds, depending upon the plausibility of the chosen solution, i.e., lastly depending upon the accessibility of the knowledge they are based on. The state of the cognitive context acts as a set of hypotheses that favour the most relevant interpretations. This predictive mechanism differs heavily from classical top-down analysis.
Thus, while trying to make explicit the subliminal processes underlying language ability, we want to define a more realistic model of understanding (which may substantially differs from a linguistic analysis!). Here, we do not want to account for an explicit, formal reasoning process, but for spontaneous, non controlled inferences that allow information to go from the subliminal, perceptive level to the conscious level.
A model of memory
As mentioned above, memory plays a crucial role towards understanding, since it contains mental structures created or used by the interpretative process. In computer science, it is usually thought that memory is a homogeneous space where knowledge is stored, a position that has been widely criticised (Edelman 1989 , Rosenfield 1992 , Vignaux 1992 : several aspects of language, not very often studied in natural language processing, are more easily explained when associativity of mental structures and their dynamic aspects are considered. In other words, computational functionalism may be appropriate to model rational thought, but, as I already said, rational thought should not be considered as the only component of verbal communication.
I present below several functional structures into which memory can be divided. I insist here on the term functional, since these structures should not be taken for the biological underlying structures, even if some of these functions may be localised somewhere in the brain (our objective here is to model some cognitive capabilities of the mind, without any commitment to neural nets). We propose a model based on three distinct kinds of memory (Figure 1 ).
Some basic properties of the model find their origin in psycholinguistic studies. First, two kinds of memory can be distinguished in human beings: a very active but short-spaced memory, whose content is constantly renewed and where the interpretations take place (short term memory), and a more stable memory, which keeps worthy of interest results of these operations (long term memory). This division is particularly clear with people whose hippocampus has been injured (Kandel and Hawkins 1992): they are still able to remember their past (before the injury) and they seem to behave normally, but, as soon as they stop their current activity (which is occupying their attention) they completely forget it (e.g., they are unable to remember who they were speaking with and what they were speaking about). Therefore, the hippocampus seems to be necessary for the cognitive system to update his long term memory, an absolutely necessary function for learning to take place. 
. General organisation of memory. Knowledge in long term memory is evoked by linguistic entities (associative recall). Then they are transferred in the working memory where interpretations set up coherence towards the cognitive context (which corresponds to the recognition of the utterance cohesion). A coherent interpretation becomes conscious and appears in the short term memory. This conscious perception triggers an automatic acquisition process and a rational, controlled treatment (cf. § 2.2.2 and 4.5 for a more detailed presentation).
Volatile memory in its turn may be divided into two parts, one very limited in space and conscious (Miller 1956) , and a subliminal part, a little bit larger (which we named working memory). In order for mental structures to be reused, they have either to be still in the short term memory or to have been stored in the long term memory.
The subliminal level has been less studied than the conscious level, but several psychological experiments have shown its existence, particularly concerning lexical access (Swinney and Hakes 1976) : all the meanings of a polysemic word are activated in a parallel way, even if, in a real context, only one of them is usually selected and consciously perceived (for every meaning -be it relevant for the following discourse or not -the same priming effect on close semantic data can be demonstrated).
I propose below a computer model (implemented in Smalltalk 80) capable of simulating this kind of behaviour.
The "Sketchboard" (a memory for subliminal processes)
Neurobiological evidence and computer science point of view
First, it should be noted that -in contradiction with what seemed to be implied by our previous model (Sabah and Briffault 1993) -there is no homunculus scrutinising the state of the brain: the brain analyses itself, creates and examines again its own productions in a « truly creative loop » (Harth 1993). This is particularly obvious for the vision process, where the existence of top-down paths has been demonstrated at the neurobiological level very early (Ramón y Cajal 1933) , and is still a topical question (Kosslyn 1980, Kosslyn and Koenig 1992) . It has also been shown that these paths actively participate in the vision process by injecting new information (not present in the initial message) on behalf of higher levels: the initial message is modified on the basis of this auto-referential process (bootstrap). Furthermore, (Restak 1979) has convincingly argued that these auto-referential loops govern the whole nervous system. This mechanism is basically unstable (possibly explaining creativity). This means that brain zones are not seen as relays where data are stored, but as zones where the cortex produces sketches, modifies them and reinterprets them. This variability is a necessary feature to allow for adaptation in a modifying environment, as argued by Edelman who suggests a Darwinist interpretation of the evolution of the brain (Edelman 1989 , Edelman 1992 . (Harth 1993) takes the same kind of approach and shows how various kinds of feedback allow to account for normal vision processes as well as for optical illusions.
A priori, blackboards (initially presented in Hearsay II (Erman, et al. 1980 ) and extended later (Hayes-Roth 1985, Nii 1986)) seem interesting as a way of modelling this kind of process. They allow for an efficient solution to the control problem and for an efficient dynamic ordering of the processes to be triggered. However, this opportunistic behaviour does not allow higher modules (e.g., semantics, pragmatics) to feedback information to lower level modules (e.g., perception): within blackboards, as soon as a process has been triggered, it writes its results onto the blackboard, and further processes have no influence on these results. Feedback from higher levels truly exists in blackboards, but it rather concerns the strategy of choosing among several possible solutions: inferences from higher levels allow to choose the most relevant process in a given context, but cannot directly interfere with the behaviour of this process. This kind of feedback does not model the situation where a given process is capable of adapting its own behaviour in order to produce an improved result, better adapted to higher level knowledge.
Even with a sophisticated system such as BB1 (Hayes-Roth 1985) , which is an excellent result of a declarative conception of control (a blackboard is devoted to the control itself), some problems are still present (without mentioning the complexity problem). In particular, declarativity of knowledge, necessary for a flexible and opportunistic control, does not guarantee that the constructed objects be coherent, nor does it guarantee that they converge towards elements useful for the final solution. This problem is linked to the notion of meaning: constructed objects have meaning only from an external point of view, not for the program itself, and therefore cannot be the basis for a semantic control. Furthermore, the fact that the more recent GUARDIAN (Hayes-Roth, et al. 1992) claims to be based on a rational use of knowledge does not seem to me to be a significant response to the problem raised here.
Thus, in the blackboard model, incoherence can result from conflicts between resources or from duplicate actions (Davis and Smith 1983, Lesser and Corkill 1983) . Hewitt (Hewitt 1986) discusses the complexity of this problem: agents must reason about the intentions and knowledge states of other agents that use heterogeneous representations. This requirement implies the use of sophisticated communication means such as blackboards or message passing. Blackboard models have no local memory linked to their agents. Hence, the agents are not able to reason about their behaviour, neither are they able to communicate directly with other agents: control is centralised and completely independent from the other agents of the system. On the other hand, in the actor model, as shown in Hewitt's early (Hewitt 1977) and subsequent work (Agha and Hewitt 1986, Hewitt and Jong 1984) , there is no public zone for communication. Hence, control remains implicit, making it difficult to maintain global coherence while reasoning.
In the Sketchboard model, the higher levels of knowledge can provide feedback to lower levels so that the latter can adjust their behaviour in order to be as coherent as possible with the results of the former.
Moreover, the same data can be considered under various points of view, implying different processings and producing different results. For example, concerning natural language understanding, several contexts may be relevant (e.g., perceptive context, conceptual thought context, intention context, communicative context), and the various interpretations with respect to these heterogeneous contexts may bear contradictions. Even in such situations these different contexts should interact and give rise to a global interpretation.
We show below how the Sketchboard allows these kinds of interactions to be modelled, in a possibly parallel way.
Another blackboard characteristic implies that all data is handled the same way as others. In other words, as soon as a process has discovered data that may act as an input, it is triggered. Since the global solution is not yet available, no control -be it as sophisticated as possible -will be able to evaluate the importance of partial results towards the final solution.
Our Sketchboard contains a mechanism for reactive feedback loops, generalised across all the modules that interact when solving a problem. As higher and higher level modules are triggered, the initial sketches become more and more precise, taking into account the whole knowledge of the system.
The Sketchboard model
Our Sketchboard (strongly inspired from Harth's work) is an extended blackboard: in addition to being a general input-output zone, responsible for triggering modules and managing their communication, it sets up specific relations between a specialised process and the processes that use its results. These relations allow for feedback from the latter and explain how the former adapts its behaviour according to these interactions.
Our extension allows the processes not only to be triggered in an opportunistic way (as in usual blackboards) but also to be considered from two different points of view: (a) either they build a given kind of result (a sketch, possibly rough and vague) or (b) they return a simple response that indicates the degree of confidence concerning their results.
Interactions between modules
In Figure 2 , agent A produces an input for agent B. In addition to its own result, B sends R(S) to A -a response from B (not its result!) -in order to indicate to A how pleased B is with what it has done with S, -A's result. This allows the Sketchboard to set up original relations between active processes. While higher and higher-level processes are triggered, the first sketch will become more and more precise, for these processes will give feedback to the first module, indicating the relevance of what is computed with regard to their own knowledge. At the end of the process, though the system remains trully modular, its entire knowledge is taken into account. In the example illustrated in Figure 2 , the two modules are in a loop: the first one (A) modifies its result in order to optimise the response from the second one (B). In other words, a first sketch S is computed by A, and further refined, such that R(S) be optimal according to a given criterion. A's behaviour is purely reactive 3 : if its previous modification produces a better response from B, it continues modifying its sketch in the same way, otherwise it performs modification the other way round. This mechanism continues until some stability is reached: this amounts to modifying the signal until B's interpretation is as relevant as possible, given the context and the available knowledge. ( Context is represented here by active modules and the sketches they have written onto the Sketchboard. Available knowledge is the knowledge stored in the long term memory and used by these modules. The measure of relevance depends on the kind of the module itself -we shall see some examples below.) This loop and the noise generator allow for small variations for a given solution and may amplify such variations and produce features, absent in the initial message (bootstrapping). This results in a non linear process: high level agents act not only as filters for perceptions, but as a device adding features, thus modifying the characteristics of the input.
In its turn (and while the previous loop is still running), B too will receive feedback from higher level processes. As shown in Figure 3 , this will influence its own sketch and, consequently, the strength of its response to A. Progressively, the various sketches will simultaneously become more and more refined. As higher-level modules provide feedback, the relevance of the results produced by a module with regard to higher-level knowledge is established. The Sketchboard then has to fulfil three main tasks: to detect which module is working on what data, to connect the modules that will give rise to elementary connections, and to handle their resulting exchanges.
One important feature is that there is no "output" from the system: the Sketchboard is read by the modules that are working on it, and the feeling of understanding results from some stability of the whole system. It should be noted that some modules may be specialised in computing expectations. Therefore, some results written into the Sketchboard account for the fact that the system is waiting for a given kind of data. Hence, a special process, related to consciousness, may be aware of a difference between what is computed and what is expected. This feature allows us to model the process of unconscious attention (cf. § 4.4).
The model has been implemented and tested on simple examples that show its feasibility and usefulness (Sabah 1996) . Currently, we are in the process of applying the Sketchboard model to natural language understanding within the CARAMEL project. The precise definition of feedback measures for the different processes is still under study.
Multiple interactions and relations to memory
Similarly to blackboards, the Sketchboard is divided into several layers in order to simplify the control process: when data appear at a given level, only a limited number of modules (a priori known) may be triggered. Figure 4 shows a simple example where three modules interact at three different levels.
But things may be more complex, for at least two reasons: at a given level, (a) previous data may stay for a variable length of time, and (b) several modules may act in parallel on the same data. To allow for such behaviour, a given amount of memory is allocated to each level of the Sketchboard. This allows the system to maintain the data active for a certain amount of time, and to store alternative results from the active modules.
In relation to the memory model presented in paragraph 1.3, the working memory is the set of memories linked to these various processing levels. Data that are still in such a memory may receive feedback from higher levels and may be compared with competing data of the same level. Those receiving the highest amount of feedback are most likely to lead to a correct solution.
This allows us to model a forgetting mechanism as well. Another important role of the Sketchboard is to keep track of the various relations among the active modules. For this to be possible, it manages the limited amount of memory at every level and keeps a hierarchical representation of the various solutions currently under development. This allows the system to give preference to data receiving positive feedback from higher level, and lower the expectations for those receiving negative feedback or more radically, space becoming short, to forget them.
Further experimentation is necessary in order to determine the exact amount of memory necessary for each level. This may imply quite different behaviours of the system, since, if something has disappeared from a working memory, and if the chosen solution appears to be poor, it may be necessary to re-analyse the data from scratch. Had the size of the working memory been different, feedback from higher levels would have performed the task in a different way. However, reasonably-sized experimentation is needed to choose the optimal size of the working memories (one hypothesis I wish to test is that there is a strong relation ship between those various working memory sizes and the cognitive style of entity modelled).
Garden-path sentences 4 are a good example of such a situation. Our model predicts three possible behaviours of the system, depending on the accessibility of the element that allows to solve the ambiguity -which seems to be in agreement with psychological experiments (Ferreira and Henderson 1991) . If the various working memories are such that the different solutions are still present when the element that solves the ambiguity appears, feedback will only favour the correct meaning (since the other ones will receive negative feedback from the higher levels of interpretation). But, if the memory sizes are such that feedback from the resolving level comes only after feedback from previous levels (which naturally lead to a wrong interpretation -this is the characteristic of this kind of sentence), the wrong interpretation may receive positive feedback and can be developed simultaneously to the correct one. Lastly, if the element that allows to solve the ambiguity arrives too late, the correct interpretation is no more in the working memory, and understanding will result in a dead-lock.
Controlled processes (the old Caramel)
As I have already said, blackboards are very useful when various processes interact in different styles according to a goal or a situation, but at a certain cost. Since different modules contribute in unpredictable order to the final solution, there is a problem of control. Studies have already show how to solve this problem efficiently, in particular in the domain of natural language (Bachimont 1992 , Sabah et Briffault 1993 , Sabah, et al. 1991 . We also showed (Sabah 1990a, Sabah and Briffault 1993) that (a) modularity is a practical need, (b) an independent control is needed in order to choose the most useful agent to be used in a given situation and (c) in order to adapt the agent behaviour to the situation, this control should be distributed among the agents, giving them the capability to represent themselves, as well as what they are doing. This allows to dynamically choose the processes that will solve a problem, and to dynamically compute the order in which they should be triggered, depending on the global task (understanding a text, abstracting it or managing a dialogue) as well as on the specific current context.
Explicit control and reflectivity
Such a control is easier to implement within distributed artificial intelligence; it requires that each agent be a reflective system, i.e., a system that uses a representation of itself to reason about its own behaviour.
Therefore, for every agent, we need to clearly distinguish the knowledge about the domain as well as the knowledge about the agent behaviour and its interaction with the other agents (cf. Figure 4) . If one accepts an analogy between the behaviour of a complex system and mental activity, having knowledge about its own activity may correspond to an implementation of a partial consciousness (Minsky 1985) .
The object (agent A in Figure 4 ) and its representation are two different systems, each being a classical system. Thus, meta-reasoning is performed just as any other kind of reasoning.
Nevertheless, for the meta-level to represent the initial system, a causal link between the system and its representation must exist (the representation is always truthful) (Maes 1987 ). In the same vein, Smith (Smith 1986) introduces the notions of introspective integrity (significant properties of the meta-representation are related to the objet-level) and of introspective force (how the goals of the object level of a reflective system are performed through the top-down causal connection).
Our CARAMEL architecture is designed to integrate the representations and expertise needed to perform various natural language processing tasks. The representations are stored in a memory containing the knowledge and intermediate structures of the system (cf. Figure 6 ). CARAMEL is a multi-expert system with a continuous control and a dynamic management, based on blackboards mixed with message passing (this allows a first static plan, depending only on the task, to be dynamically adapted to the current data to be understood). It is a recursive implementation of reflective models. Two kinds of extensions (developed in the next paragraph) have been implemented to allow for a more efficient use of reflective models:
• a meta-system is a system that may have control over several agents, and • meta-systems themselves are considered usual agents and are represented at a meta-level. 
Meta-system
Extensions to classical reflectivity
First, rather than having a flat set of agents, each of them being linked to its meta-system, we propose a more general kind of meta-system controlling several agents. This allows us to take advantage of the fact that, when several agents act in the same subdomain, the additional knowledge used to control them (the heuristics that allow for a choice among them) may be the same.
Another extension consists in considering meta-systems themselves as usual agents (the set composed of a meta-system and the agents under its control is itself considered an agent -called compound). This set plays the same role as a single agent, and can thus be represented in, and associated with, its metalevel, which makes it reflective as well. The reflective mechanism applies recursively at various levels, resulting in a hierarchical organisation of the agents: to reach a given goal, an agent has at its disposal several means (the agents it controls and may trigger). 
Figure 5. A compound meta-system controlling three agents
Meta-systems may themselves be reflective, controlling other agents, which may also be reflective and so on. The structure of the system is fully recursive, but each level manages its own blackboard, in which only the relevant piece of data is written. Figure 6 shows a hierarchy of compound agents: the higher level of control whose task is to understand a text, triggered the sentence parser. The parser, in its turn, encountering an unforeseen problem, triggered simultaneously the ellipsis solver and the error manager.
The embedding of meta-agents does not make the system overly complex nor inefficient. On the contrary, since it implies an a priori decomposition of the problems into sub-problems, it allows for a simpler planning process, which is the main part of our control mechanism. This "reflection" applies recursively, which corresponds to a hierarchical organisation of the agents, and its behaviour implies a continuous interaction between the usual reasoning of an agent and the reflective reasoning of its controller.
It is important to note that regarding the main controller and the sub-controllers, there is a continuous exchange between usual reasoning of an agent and reflective reasoning of its controller: the task for a complex agent M being to perform a goal G, M computes a static plan that consists of a sequence of agents it controls {A i } 5 . Such reasoning is top-down, recursive and does not depend on the specific data to be processed.
The plan is then executed within M's common blackboard: the A i produce their results in this memory or send a message to M to point out an unforeseen problem. Such a message, as well as any modification of the memory, triggers a reflective activity: a dynamic planning process tries to find what agents may solve the problem raised (when no solution is found, M itself sends a help message to S (M)), to check consistency, and to handle contingent aspects. These reasoning processes are close to hierarchical or meta-level planning (Stefik 1981 , Wilkins 1984 
Figure 7. Continuous exchange between usual reasoning and reflective reasoning
The controller also builds in its working memory a representation of the dynamic reasoning process, that is the sequence of agents that has allowed it to perform its task. This gives the system the ability to explain its actions and the choosen strategy. Memorising what has been done and reasoning about it is, from our point of view, a useful part of consciousness. Nevertheless there are cases where more than a dynamic control is necessary. Our goal in the next paragraph is to go closer to a true consciousness…
A Bridge between the Sketchboard and the controlled processes: the role of consciousness
We will give here some precise ideas regarding the implementation of the various notions presented. This will result in a "revisited CARAMEL", used not only to understand and generate natural language, but also as a general model for intelligent behaviour, since, as we will argue in the conclusion, language understanding should be a basis for intelligence in general.
As in Figure 8 , consciousness is modelled as a controlled process able to trigger various subprocesses. Its data are stored in a blackboard. These data are permanent data (linked to the self) as well as results coming from the Sketchboard (candidates to become conscious). The various subprocesses are in charge of managing and evaluating the permanent goals, of evaluating the relevance of the candidates from the Sketchboard, of maintaining the self representation and so on. 
Short term memory
Conscious "pop-up"
Figure 8.Consciousness as a bridge between subliminal and controlled processes. A piece of data in the Sketchboard is evaluated as deserving to become conscious (unconscious "pop-up") and later processed by controlled (conscious) processes. Relevant results of this conscious processing may also be made explicitly conscious (conscious "pop-up"). Control of consciousness decides whenever a piece of data or a specific problem deserve to be consciously processed or not; it also evaluates conscious processes, which, when encountered several times, give rise to unconscious processes (compilation).
When a piece of data deserves to become conscious (see § 4.1), it is written in the short term memory which acts as a blackboard for consciousness. Therefore, our short term memory is very analogous to Baars' global conscious workspace (Baars 1988) which, unconscious processes are competing to take control of. This global blackboard is managed through a stack mechanism: any conscious event that becomes redundant may be replaced by a more informative subsequent event.
An important role of the interaction between the Sketchboard and the controlled processes through consciousness is to unify disparate results into a coherent whole. Therefore, it has a constructive function that neither unconscious processes, nor controlled processes, are able to perform on their own.
Criteria
We give here some criteria that may be used to decide whether a piece of data should be made conscious or not.
As mentioned above, different sequences of unconscious processes may act in a parallel way within the Sketchboard, and these sequences are analogous to Baars' competing contexts. Therefore, consciousness may be seen as permanently reading the Sketchboard and managing the writing within the short term memory. Only stable results -and deserving it -are written into this blackboard.
The notion of "deserving" relates to three other notions: the "feeling of understanding", the "feeling of ambiguity", and the "feeling of contradiction".
The "feeling of understanding" leads to some results becoming conscious. As we saw in section 2.2, this feeling of understanding is represented through some sort of stability within the Sketchboard. This stability is recognised when no significant shift appears, after several iterations. When such a situation is detected, the final result is transmitted to the short term memory, with the goal of integrating this new information within the currently active knowledge, in order to produce locally coherent data.
Another important reason for a result to become conscious is the "feeling of ambiguity". Cases where several solutions are relevant correspond to situations where data in the Sketchboard waver between several configurations (a "lasting instability"). This will give rise, not to a conscious result, but to a conscious problem to be consciously solved: when no clear decision is suitable, the choice will be left to a controlled, conscious process. Therefore, partial results obtained from the Sketchboard are written into the higher control level blackboard, with the goal of resolving the remaining ambiguity.
Finally, there is the "feeling of contradiction". Such a situation is detected when a stable result in the Sketchboard is in contradiction with a goal managed within consciousness. In the same way as above, these results are transmitted to the conscious level in order for the problem to be solved by conscious means.
These criteria imply that only the results obtained through conscious perceptions are made available to other sources of knowledge, even though unconscious perceptions may influence further processing. Tthis is explained in our model by the fact that fleeting results in the Sketchboard may imply some reordering of the goals of consciousness, even if those are not made conscious thereafter.
Hierarchical representation and effects of goals
The process that models consciousness keeps a representation of various relevant objects (including a representation of the self) that represent the goals of the individual. In order to direct the behaviour of the individual these goals are organised as a hierarchy where the higher goals are the most permanent ones (cf. Baars' goals and conceptual contexts). Goals are represented in consciousness as sets of properties to be maintained or to be made true about these representations. The range of these more or less implicit goals is very large, since they include very basic goals (e.g., to survive, to eat, to drink) as well as much more immediate goals (e.g.,to get a given cake).
The very basic goals (analogous to Edelman's basic values) may be seen as innate compiled processes or processes internalised to a point that their declarative aspects have disappeared. On the other hand, more immediate goals are written into the short term memory. Intermediate implicit goals account for pragmatic constraints (reasons for speaking), discourse constraints (turn-taking, sticking to the topic, etc.), lexical and syntactic constraints, and so on. Reaching simultaneously all these goals will, for example, produce the sentence I want this cake.
The priorities of these goals (their relative importance) are constantly and dynamically reevaluated. The result of this evaluation has significant influence on the evaluation of the candidates coming from the Sketchboard in order to become conscious (a piece of data that will be made conscious is one that favours the most important goals). In other words, these goals represent constraints that a piece of data should respect in order to become conscious.
Since the behaviour of controlled processes is based on a double planning process (computing in a static way how the current goal can be reached and how this first plan should be dynamically adapted (Sabah 1990 , Sabah et Briffault 1993 ), the deep goals may also have a significant influence on the conscious processes, as they can be introduced into the plans that these processes try to consciously complete.
These pre-defined goals are activated in an unconscious way, depending on the situation; they drive processes in the Sketchboard (various competing goals will result in sequences of processes acting in a parallel way within the Sketchboard). When there is no competition or when a solution is reached without any control, the process remains unconscious. On the other hand, when a goal or a sub-goal cannot be reached in that way, it becomes conscious and heavier planning processes will be used to reach it consciously.
Reaching goals
When a goal has been made explicit within consciousness (as a representation to be built or as a given property that a representation should hold), the system first seeks for an automatic means allowing to reach it. If it can be found (i.e., an unconscious process acting within the Sketchboard is a priori evaluated as a good candidate for achieving the task), it is triggered and the hierarchy of goals is re-evaluated, depending on its result.
If such a process cannot be found, the corresponding goal is given to the first level of controlled processes, which triggers conscious reasoning and planning. How the repetition of such process may lead to learning will be evoked in paragraph 4.5.
We are envisaging the extension of the conscious reasoning processes so that a closer intrication with unconscious processes could be achieved: when a controller must reach a given goal, it can act in a similar way as consciousness by first trying to find an unconscious process that may reach the goal (before trying to reach its goal with complex planning processes). An open question here is to decide whether such a situation implies that processes need to be triggered in the Sketchboard as presented above, or if the Sketchboard itself is distributed as well (with several Sketchboards respectively linked to various conscious controllers). Such an implementation would produce an entanglement of conscious and unconscious processes closer to what we can suspect about what happens in our brains.
Relation with attention
As shown in Figure 8 , attention is the process that makes a result or a running process conscious. Since consciousness is being modelled as a reflective process (as described in section 4), its meta-level may be seen as the process that models attention. In other words, attention partially controls consciousness. Then, we can distinguish between:
• unintentional attention (automatic) triggered by surprise (a difference between a computed result and some expectation). This will produce the conscious emergence of the corresponding results; and • wilful attention triggered by a conscious (controlled) process. This will produce the conscious writing of a goal (or sub-goal) to be reached. Processes used to reach this goal are consciously triggered. The more a mental representation is predictable, the more rapidly it tends to weaken; the more it is new and informative, the more it is likely to be conscious. This accounts for the fact that novelty or distance from expectations are the main reasons for a stimulus to become conscious. But to emerge, a conscious experience needs a degree of internal coherence, otherwise its accessibility will rapidly decrease due to the competition among alternative solutions. Figure 8 shows the relations between the three essential levels evoked here (unconscious processes, controlled processes and consciousness).
Learning
Our model also accounts for some aspects of learning. Entities that stay for a while in the short term memory, and therefore that have been consciously perceived, are not completely obliterated when there are no longer useful. They keep a residual accessibility in the long term memory, accessibility which is proportional to their persistence and their frequency of use. This transfer of data from short term memory (very volatile) to long term memory (much more lasting) is a first kind of acquisition (precise criteria to decide when this should occur remain to be exhibited).
Secondly, we consider that some processes may exist in the system under two different forms: a) when it uses declarative rules, it is a controlled, conscious process, b) but if it has been compiled, when the resulting code is triggered, it acts as an unconscious process within the Sketchboard.
Questions still remain regarding the situation of this distinction with respect to learning: how declarative rules are first built through various experiments, how some stability among these rules is detected, and how this results in a compiled version of the process. When a new problem 6 appears, it is handled by controlled processes. At each step, these processes dynamically compute the relevant plans and rules to be used. If the same kind of problem is encountered several times, the same rules could be found. Since this kind of process has the ability to represent its behaviour and to reason about it, it will be able to detect such a situation. Then, the corresponding rules would be compiled, and the characteristics of the result of this compilation given to the Sketchboard manager. Subsequently, the Sketchboard will be able to trigger this new process if it is needed. Thus, the whole system has "learnt" how to solve this new kind of problem, and will make use of his previous experience at the time of its current behaviour.
Evaluation of the model
Four essential properties of consciousness
We examine here four attributes of consciousness that Harth (Harth 1993) considers essential: selectivity, exclusivity, linking and unity (his definitions). We then try to evaluate our model through these definitions.
• Selectivity. Not all neural activities enter consciousness (perceptions, sensations, feelings). Thus, an important role of consciousness (linked to free will) is to select, among random events, those possibly leading to "interesting" thoughts.
• Exclusivity. Being conscious of something prevents us from thinking of something else at the same time (cf. the classical Necker cube). Consciousness has therefore a sequentialising effect (e.g., we can consciously explain what we would do as a classical von Neumann machine, but not as a parallel machine). The fact that the brain can simultaneously carry out hundred of tasks reinforces the first point that all processings cannot be conscious.
• Chaining. Items in consciousness are chained together, linked by association and reasoning. This implies the serial character of consciousness as well as its constructive role (putting together disparate results of unconscious processes).
• Unitarity. Consciousness unifies both the person who posseses it and the content of his or her conscious mind. It provides the continuity of our selfhood throughout our life span. To do that, consciousness may re-create or modify data as well as results of the perceptive processes.
Taking into account the last two elements, Dennett (Dennett 1993) opposes a stalinian (sic) vision of consciousness (non suitable events are deleted or modified) to an orwellian image (sic-again) (representations of never-occurring events are artificially built).
The new Caramel and the above properties
• Selectivity. In the paragraph 4.1, we have presented the criteria that are used in order to determine when a piece of data deserves to become conscious. Therefore, the system selects cases where it has the feeling of understanding or when a difficult problem arises, in order to make these situations conscious, since they may lead to interesting situations.
• Exclusivity. When the model is implemented on a single computer, processes within the Sketchboard may act in a parallel way, while controlled processes (following static and dynamic planning) act sequentially. However the machine does not have to follow this constraint: it may be implemented on a net of machines. We have shown elsewhere (Fournier, et al. 1988 , Fournier, et al. 1990 ) that even with controlled processes a parallel implementation could be a significant improvement.
• Linking. This is typically the role of the process that simulates consciousness in our model: as it is partially based on a coherence maintenance, various significant results coming from the Sketchboard are transmitted to the controlled processes in order to build a coherent whole with them. Therefore, consciousness has a constructive role too in our model.
• Unity. The Sketchboard is based on the idea of modifying the very first results of perceptions so that they become coherent with higher level previous knowledge. So, as unifying external world events, our model of consciousness is in accord with this point. Many questions remain to be answered so that it may be considered as unifying a mind…
Language and consciousness
Bresnan and Kaplan (Bresnan and Kaplan 1981) , following Chomsky (Chomsky 1966 , Chomsky 1968 , discuss various constraints on syntactic mapping:
• creativity (possibility of constructing means for characterising, any of the infinite number of grammatical sentences); • finite capacity (the infinite number of grammatical sentences results from finite set of words and relations and finite storage ability); • reliability (a syntactic construction can be judged reliably, independently of context and meaning); • order-free composition (local grammatical relations can be constructed for arbitrary fragments of sentences); • universality (any string of words is related to some mental structure by a universal procedure).
(Edelman 1989, Rosenfield 1992) underline that there exist strong relationships between these characteristics and some aspects of consciousness.
• the creativity constraint is provided by the linkage to cortical conceptual systems that allow enormous combinatorial power due to a special memory for new conceptual combinations (this means is supplied by reentrant memory systems [Broca's and Wernicke's areas, for example] that interact with already existing conceptual systems); • the finite capacity constraint is explained by considering memory as a form of recategorisation with strong capabilities of generalisation;
• the reliability constraint is related to the fact that the already existing conceptual system can treat verbal productions as a set of objects to be classified; • the order-free constraint is due to the fact that syntax emerges from semantics and phonology; • the universality constraint is consistent with the categorisation of productions by the conceptual system, performed by the same process used for learning in general.
The importance of the inner speech. Language also has an extremely important role: the inner voice maintains a running commentary about our experiences and feelings, it helps to relate past events to plans for the future. Habit and learning imply that this inner speech becomes less and less conscious.
However, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between such an inner speech and a hypothetical "language of thought" since there can be no identity at any level.
With a given point of view, "to speak" is equivalent to "make conscious", and from this, language gives us extraordinary possibilities to extend our memory: our short term memory, first, with the inner speech, our long term memory afterwards, thanks to communication with other people, and lastly with written language and books… Therefore, language is the greatest means of storing knowledge and plays an essential role within any conscious episode that makes past, present or future events explicit. This leads Edelman to a remark that undermines the main role of consciousness for natural language understanding:
« The main reason why computers are unable to tackle the problem of semantics becomes clear: the implementation cannot be correct since it does not lead to consciousness » (Edelman 1992).
Conclusion
It may be decades before we have the talking computers popularised in science fiction. Moreover, we cannot guarantee that we will even be capable of building a computer program that understands human language perfectly. We have elaborated in this paper two propositions concerning conscious and unconscious processes. The first is a conceptual model that allows for a flexible and efficient implementation of intelligent systems. We have proposed extensions of reflective systems to the domain of DAI. In our implementation, control is explicit at various levels, thus making possible to use strategic knowledge at varying degrees of generality. The second proposition concerns a new data structure, the Sketchboard, an extension of Blackboards, allowing different modules to collaborate while solving a problem. This model allows feedback from higher levels to lower levels of processing, without any explicit control.
While the ideas presented in the two first sections have been implemented (a running version exists in LISP for the first one and is currently being rewritten in Smalltalk, a Smalltalk version exists for the second), it is not the case for the ideas presented in section 4, which remain to be fully tested. Several aspects remain to be implemented and tested through reasonably-sized experimentations before a number of parameters of the model may be efficiently chosen. However, it seemed very important to show that consciousness is not as far from Artificial Intelligence modelling capabilities as some would claim.
I have argued for reflectivity to be a central point for intelligent processing and for natural language understanding. Semantics is nowadays the bottleneck for real size implementations that are to remain psychologically relevant. I think semantics should be better grounded and take perceptive aspects into account, and I showed here that our Sketchboard is a possible way of doing so.
Then, I presented some ideas in order to build a model of consciousness that is a bridge between these two models. Our proposal is primarily conceived as being implementable. But, we believe it to have true psychological relevance, since it takes into account the fact that neither interactive nor modular language-processing systems emerge. Instead, some components of language-processing should be modular and others interactive.
To go further I would assert that language understanding must provide the basic process for almost every other intelligent mechanism, since for us human beings, language is the essential basis that allows for many other cognitive abilities. Even if this should be a very long term research, I hope I have been convincing enough for this alternative be considered a possible and promising way, and may be the real future of AI…
